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I INTRODUCTION 
This year (2017), Australia is very likely to accede to an international treaty 
commonly known as the Hague Convention1 — the treaty has been laid before 
Parliament, the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties has recommended 
accession,2 and work is already underway on the implementing legislation.3 The 
Hague Convention was negotiated under the auspices of the Hague Conference 
on Private International Law (‘Hague Conference’), the principal international 
organisation responsible for global efforts to harmonise rules of private 
international law. It has potentially very important implications for international 
commercial dispute resolution in Australia, in the Asia-Pacific region and indeed 
internationally. 
The Hague Convention concerns jurisdiction agreements, also known as 
choice of court clauses — those clauses we have all seen in contracts which deal 
with the forum in which disputes must be resolved. They may be complex 
constructions of several paragraphs, or at their simplest may be only two words 
(‘Jurisdiction: Victoria’), but most commonly state something like: ‘Any dispute 
arising under this contract must be heard exclusively in the courts of Victoria’. 
These clauses are commonplace and they may seem banal — certainly, few of us 
read through such fine print in the many contracts we make on a daily basis and 
the location in which potential disputes may be resolved is rarely at the forefront 
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 1 Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, opened for signature 30 June 2005, 44 ILM 
1294 (entered into force 1 October 2015) (‘Hague Convention’). See also Trevor Hartley 
and Masato Dogauchi, ‘Explanatory Report on the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Agreements 
Convention’ (Explanatory Report, Hague Conference on Private International Law, 2013) 
<https://www.hcch.net/upload/expl37final.pdf> archived at <https://perma.cc/G7NU-
BSR9>.  
 2 See Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of Australia, Report 166 (2016). 
 3 Attorney-General’s Department, Annual Report 2015–16 (2016) 29. It is proposed that the 
implementing legislation will in addition adopt the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in 
International Commercial Contracts (‘Hague Principles’), a soft law instrument also 
developed at the Hague Conference on Private International Law and finalised in 2015: 
Hague Conference on Private International Law, Principles on Choice of Law in 
International Commerical Contracts, The Hague Conference on Private International Law 
Permanent Bureau, 2015  
<http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=135> archived at 
<https://perma.cc/G7NU-BSR9>. See Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Parliament of 
Australia, Report 166 (2016) [3.6]. The Hague Principles will not be discussed in this paper, 
except to note that they permit parties to agree that a contract may be governed by non-state 
law, which would be rather innovative if adopted in Australian law. 
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of the minds of contracting parties. Jurisdiction agreements can, however, be 
extremely important, because the venue for dispute resolution is often very 
significant for practical or strategic reasons and for some disputes can even be 
outcome determinative. This is particularly because the choice of forum may 
affect the governing law, as different forums may apply different choice of law 
rules or mandatory statutes. The Hague Convention is focused particularly on 
exclusive jurisdiction agreements — those agreements which seek to confer 
jurisdiction on the nominated court to the exclusion of any other court. 
This paper addresses four points. First, it examines the effects of exclusive 
jurisdiction agreements under current Australian law. Secondly, the key 
provisions of the Hague Convention are outlined and explained. Thirdly, the 
potential impact of the Hague Convention on Australian law is examined. 
Fourthly and finally, some of the key regional and international implications of 
the Hague Convention are analysed, in light of Singapore’s accession to the 
Hague Convention in 2016, which potentially has particularly significant 
implications for dispute resolution in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as 
Australia’s proposed accession. 
II EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION AGREEMENTS UNDER CURRENT AUSTRALIAN 
LAW 
An analysis of the effects of exclusive jurisdiction agreements must consider 
their impact both on the chosen court as well as on courts which are not chosen. 
It must also consider their effects on questions of jurisdiction as well as more 
indirectly in the context of the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments. This gives us a table of four different contexts in which exclusive 
jurisdiction agreements may affect Australian law, in which five distinct effects 
may be identified. 
 
Table 1 
 Jurisdiction Judgments 
Impact in chosen court 1. Prorogation 
2. Anti-suit injunction and 
damages for breach 
5. Non-recognition of judgment 
from non-chosen court 
Impact in non-chosen court 3. Derogation 4. Recognition and enforcement 
of judgment from chosen court 
 
Each of these five effects will now be considered in turn. 
A Prorogation 
The most obvious effect of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement is on the 
jurisdiction of the chosen court. Under the laws of the various Australian state 
and federal courts (referred to in this paper as ‘Australian courts’ for 
convenience), exclusive jurisdiction agreements provide a basis for jurisdiction 
even if the dispute or the parties have no other connection with Australia.4 It is 
important to note, however, that if the defendant does not accept the jurisdiction 
                                                 
 4 See, eg, Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 (Vic) r 7.02(b)(iv).  
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of the chosen court once proceedings have been commenced, there remains a 
discretion for the court not to exercise its jurisdiction (at least in theory), under 
the doctrines of forum conveniens or forum non conveniens.5 The qualification 
‘at least in theory’ is necessary, because there are few if any cases in which 
Australian courts have actually exercised this discretion, as an exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement is considered a very powerful reason to exercise 
jurisdiction.6 However, there are exceptional cases (discussed below) in which 
English courts in equivalent circumstances have declined to exercise jurisdiction 
even where there was an exclusive jurisdiction agreement in their favour. It is 
true that the test for forum non conveniens is defined more strictly in Australia 
than it is in England,7 meaning that Australian courts are less likely in general to 
stay proceedings validly commenced, but the English practice may nevertheless 
illustrate circumstances in which an Australian court might refuse to hear a case 
despite the existence of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement in its favour. 
The most likely context in which this might occur is where the dispute 
covered by the exclusive jurisdiction agreement is part of a larger dispute, 
involving either other parties or other issues which are not covered by the 
jurisdiction agreement and which are not otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of 
the Australian courts. The position would be at its strongest if those other parties 
or issues are already being litigated before a foreign court in proceedings which 
are well advanced and where the parties or issues covered by the Australian 
exclusive choice of court agreement could be litigated as part of those foreign 
proceedings. In such circumstances, giving effect to the jurisdiction agreement 
would fragment the proceedings, decreasing the efficient resolution of the overall 
dispute, and increasing the risk of conflicting judgments between different 
courts. The English courts at least have determined that these negative 
consequences may in exceptional cases justify refusing to give effect to the 
agreement between the parties,8 and it is certainly possible that Australian courts 
would be influenced by the same considerations should such a case arise. In 
essence, the efficient resolution of complex disputes and the avoidance of the 
risk of conflicting judgments may, at least conceivably, be considered to 
outweigh the interests of giving effect to the agreement of the parties. 
B Anti-Suit Injunction and Damages for Breach 
Exclusive jurisdiction agreements in favour of an Australian court may have a 
range of further effects in the chosen court. These effects follow from the fact 
that a jurisdiction agreement is understood in the common law as a contractual 
                                                 
 5 See generally Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538; Regie Nationale 
Des Usines Renault SA v Zhang (2002) 210 CLR 491.  
 6 See, eg, Richard Garnett, ‘Jurisdiction Clauses Since Akai’ (2013) 87 Australian Law 
Journal 134, 147–8 (‘Jurisdiction Clauses’).  
 7 The leading English authority remains: Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd (1987) AC 
460. But its approach was expressly rejected by the High Court of Australia in: Voth v 
Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538; Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault SA 
v Zhang (2002) 210 CLR 491.  
 8 See, eg, Donohue v Armco Inc [2001] UKHL 64 (13 December 2001). This approach is, 
however, no longer possible because the effect of any exclusive jurisdiction agreement in 
favour of the English courts is now governed by the Brussels I Regulation rather than the 
common law.  
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obligation. If one party commences proceedings in a court other than that 
selected in the agreement, they are in breach of contract. A common remedy for 
such a breach, whether it has occurred or is merely threatened, is an order for 
specific performance of the jurisdiction agreement. This takes the form of an 
injunction restraining a party from commencing or continuing foreign 
proceedings brought in breach of an Australian choice of court agreement, which 
is of course a species of anti-suit injunction.9 While such an injunction may 
readily be granted on the basis of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement,10 it must 
be remembered that it is an equitable remedy and as such discretionary and the 
courts will take into account all the circumstances of any case. In recent years, it 
has also increasingly been recognised that breach of an exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement may alternatively or in addition sound in damages.11 
One notable further consequence of the fact that litigating in breach of an 
exclusive jurisdiction agreement is considered to be a breach of contract is that a 
claim might be made in tort where a third party has induced the breach. Such a 
claim was at the heart of the AMT Futures v Marzillier litigation before the 
Supreme Court in the United Kingdom earlier this year — a German law firm 
was sued for inducing breach of an English exclusive jurisdiction agreement by 
advising clients to sue in Germany.12 Although ultimately the Supreme Court 
held that the English courts did not have jurisdiction over the claim (as any tort 
had occurred in Germany), the case remains a high profile reminder (in 
particular, for legal practitioners) of the possibility of such claims. 
C Derogation 
Exclusive jurisdiction agreements may equally have jurisdictional effects in 
courts other than the chosen court — indeed, one of their central purposes is to 
preclude the jurisdiction of a court which is not chosen. In Australian courts, a 
foreign exclusive jurisdiction agreement is considered to be a very powerful 
reason why the court should not exercise any jurisdiction which it may have, 
either through a refusal to commence proceedings under the doctrine of forum 
conveniens or a stay of proceedings pursuant to the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens.13 As noted above, however, these doctrines are discretionary, and 
there is thus the possibility that Australian courts might hear a case despite the 
existence of a foreign exclusive jurisdiction agreement. In this context, the 
discretion to exercise jurisdiction despite such an agreement has indeed been 
exercised in a number of cases (although perhaps decreasingly).14 Two main 
circumstances in which this is likely may be identified. 
First, similarly to the analysis above, the discretion not to give effect to a 
foreign exclusive jurisdiction agreement might be exercised where the dispute 
                                                 
 9 See generally CSR v Cigna (1997) 189 CLR 345. 
 10 Aggeliki Charis Compania Maritima SA v Pagnan SpA [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 87 (‘The 
Angelic Grace’). 
 11 See, eg, Louise Merrett, ‘The Enforcement of Jurisdiction Agreements within the Brussels 
Regime’ (2006) 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 315; The Alexandros T 
[2013] UKSC 70.  
 12 AMT Futures Ltd v Marzillier mbH [2017] 2 WLR 853.  
 13 See generally Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538; Regie Nationale 
Des Usines Renault SA v Zhang (2002) 210 CLR 491. 
 14 See generally Garnett, ‘Jurisdiction Clauses’, above n 6, 140–6.  
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involved multiple parties or issues and other issues or parties were being litigated 
(or would be best litigated) in Australian courts. The court may refuse to give 
effect to the jurisdiction agreement to ensure that the whole dispute is heard in a 
single forum, for the sake of efficiency and avoiding the risk of conflicting 
judgments. 
Secondly, more distinctively, Australian courts have refused to stay 
proceedings despite a foreign exclusive jurisdiction agreement in some cases in 
which it is established that the foreign court would not recognise rights under 
Australian law — such as where the cause of action is based on an Australian 
statute which would not be applied by the foreign court.15 Australian practice on 
this point has been viewed critically by some commentators.16 
D Recognition and Enforcement 
Further effects of exclusive jurisdiction agreements may be identified in the 
rules on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. In Australia, 
these rules are generally found under either the common law or in the Foreign 
Judgments Act 1991 (Cth). In both contexts, a judgment from a foreign court 
based on a valid and applicable exclusive jurisdiction agreement in its favour 
will be generally enforceable in Australia,17 subject to various defences such as a 
breach of procedural fairness or public policy. 
E Non-Recognition 
The converse principle also applies where there is an exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement in favour of the court in which recognition or enforcement is sought. 
Foreign judgments obtained in breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement in 
favour of Australian (or indeed other foreign) courts are not enforceable — the 
only exceptions are where the agreement is invalid or inapplicable, such as 
where the defendant has waived their rights by submitting to the foreign court.18 
III INTRODUCING THE HAGUE CONVENTION 
This section explains the general scope and purposes of the Hague 
Convention, before the following section outlines its key provisions. 
A Scope 
A number of important preliminary points may be noted concerning the scope 
of the Hague Convention. 
First, it is limited to international cases, and the choice of a foreign court does 
not supply the international element.19 An exclusive choice of court agreement in 
favour of the courts of Singapore between New South Wales and Victorian 
                                                 
 15 See, eg, Hume Computers Pty Ltd v Exact International BV [2006] FCA 1439; Reinsurance 
Australia Corporation Ltd v HIH Casualty & General Insurance Ltd (in liq) [2003] FCA 56.  
 16 See, eg, Richard Garnett, ‘The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Magnum Opus or Much 
Ado About Nothing?’ (2009) 5 Journal of Private International Law 161, 166 (‘The Hague 
Choice of Court Convention’).  
 17 Foreign Judgments Act 1991 (Cth) s 7(3)(a)(iii). 
 18 Ibid s 7(4)(b). 
 19 Hague Convention art 1(1)–(2).  
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parties covering a contract to be performed in Australia would not be covered by 
the Hague Convention. 
Secondly, the Hague Convention is concerned with business-to-business 
contracts — consumer and employment contracts are specifically excluded from 
its scope.20 There is, however, no exclusion for insurance or franchise contracts, 
two further contexts in which national legal systems (including Australia)21 
frequently place restrictions on the power of parties to choose their own court. 
Under art 21 of the Hague Convention, a contracting state may exclude certain 
subject matters from its scope at the time of accession and it is possible that 
Australia may consider making such a declaration in respect of insurance and/or 
franchise contracts. 
Thirdly, it is almost entirely concerned with exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements.22 Non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements (in which the agreement 
seeks prorogation but not derogation) are generally excluded, although art 22 of 
the Hague Convention does provide an optional rule under which states may 
agree to recognise and enforce judgments based on such agreements on a 
reciprocal basis. Asymmetrical agreements, in which the agreement is exclusive 
for one party and non-exclusive for the other, or in which a different court is 
chosen exclusively for each party, are not considered exclusive for the purposes 
of the Hague Convention.23 The Hague Convention notably includes a rule that a 
jurisdiction agreement is to be presumed exclusive unless expressly provided 
otherwise,24 which is discussed further below. 
Fourthly, there are limits on the temporal and geographical scope of the 
Hague Convention. Only jurisdiction agreements entered into in favour of 
contracting states are covered,25 and only agreements entered into in favour of 
the courts of a contracting state after it has become party to the Hague 
Convention are covered — the Hague Convention has no effect on pre-existing 
jurisdiction agreements.26 
B Purpose 
The purpose of the Hague Convention has been described as an attempt to 
replicate for jurisdiction agreements the effects of the highly successful 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(‘New York Convention’) in relation to arbitration agreements and arbitral 
awards.27 This begs the question — why should this attempt be made? 
International commercial parties often prefer arbitration to litigation, in part 
because of the widespread effectiveness of arbitration agreements and 
enforceability of arbitral awards. However, arbitration also has its disadvantages, 
                                                 
 20 Ibid art 2(1).  
 21 See, eg, Akai v The People’s Insurance Co (1996) 188 CLR 418; Competition and 
Consumer (Industry Codes – Franchising) Regulations 2014 (Cth) sch 1, s 21.  
 22 Hague Convention art 1(1).  
 23 Hartley and Dogauchi, above n 1, 811 [104]‒[106], 845 [249]‒[250]. On such agreements, 
see, eg, Mary Keyes and Brooke Adele Marshall, ‘Jurisdiction Agreements: Exclusive, 
Optional and Asymmetrical’ (2015) 11 Journal of Private International Law 345.  
 24 Hague Convention art 3(b). 
 25 Ibid art 3(a). 
 26 Ibid art 16(1). 
 27 See, eg, Hartley and Dogauchi, above n 1, 791 [1]. 
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both for the parties and more broadly. It is, for example, not possible for an 
arbitral tribunal to join third party defendants who are not subject to the same 
arbitration agreement, or to take coercive measures without the assistance of a 
court. The confidentiality of arbitral proceedings and frequently also of arbitral 
awards may be an advantage to some parties but can be a disadvantage to others. 
Recently, concerns have also been raised that the popularity of arbitration may 
have harmful effects on the development of commercial law, as the 
confidentiality of the awards as well as their lack of precedential value means 
that they are frequently unable to contribute to the progressive public 
development of the law.28 
For these reasons among others, the Hague Convention aims to promote the 
choice of national courts alongside arbitration, not to replace it but to create a 
more level playing field. It seeks to do this through creating greater international 
standardisation in the treatment of exclusive jurisdiction agreements, giving 
greater effectiveness to exclusive jurisdiction agreements and increasing the 
enforceability of judgments based on exclusive jurisdiction agreements. These 
effects are each examined in further detail below. 
C Status 
At present the Hague Convention has 29 states party and the European Union 
is also a party as a ‘Regional Economic Integration Organisation’.29 Mexico 
acceded to the Hague Convention in 2007 and it came into force in 2015 when 
the EU joined both in its own right and on behalf of all of its member states 
except Denmark. Should the UK leave the EU, as expected in light of the Brexit 
vote, it will cease to be a party to the Hague Convention. There is, however, 
strong support for accession in this case as it may be necessary to ensure that 
English judgments based on an exclusive jurisdiction agreement remain readily 
enforceable across the EU.30 The most recent accession was that of Singapore in 
2016, which is potentially very significant for Australia, as discussed further 
below. The number of states party is thus significant if not yet comparable to the 
                                                 
 28 See, eg, Robert French, ‘Transnational Dispute Resolution’ (Speech delivered at the 
Supreme and Federal Court Judges’ Conference, Brisbane, 25 January 2016) 
<http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/currentjustices/frenchcj/frenchcj25J
an2016.pdf> archived at <https://perma.cc/C6YN-BHDW>; Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, 
‘Developing Commercial Law through the Courts: Rebalancing the Relationship between 
the Courts and Arbitration’ (Speech delivered at The Bailii Lecture, London, 9 March 
2016), 
<https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/lcjspeechbaillilecture20160309.
pdf> archived at <https://perma.cc/3TNB-VF2A>. 
 29 A status table is available at Hague Conference on Private International Law, 37: 
Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements (2 June 2016) 
<https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=98> archived at 
<https://perma.cc/3WKN-VPET>. 
 30 See, eg, Justice Committee, Implications of Brexit for the Justice System, House of 
Commons Paper No 9, Session 2016–17 (2017).  
8 Melbourne Journal of International Law [Vol 18(1) 
Advance Copy 
New York Convention,31 although it has been reported by the Hague Conference 
that numerous other states are considering accession to the Hague Convention.32 
IV KEY PROVISIONS OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION 
A Prorogation 
Under art 5 of the Hague Convention, the state courts which are chosen in a 
valid and effective exclusive jurisdiction agreement must exercise that 
jurisdiction. As under existing Australian law, there is no requirement for any 
objective connection between the parties or their dispute and the court chosen.33 
While state parties may impose such a requirement on accession to the Hague 
Convention under art 19, there is no reason to expect Australia will do so. 
Although the Hague Convention does not set this out expressly, it can be 
presumed that a court may refuse to exercise jurisdiction where the jurisdiction 
agreement is invalid for any reason. The question of damages for breach of a 
jurisdiction agreement is not addressed by the Hague Convention, although an 
award of such damages would arguably be a judgment based on the jurisdiction 
agreement and thus entitled to recognition and enforcement under the 
streamlined rules in the Hague Convention.34 
B Derogation 
Under art 6 of the Hague Convention, where the parties have entered into an 
exclusive choice of court agreement in favour of the courts of one Convention 
state, the courts of any other Convention state generally must not exercise 
jurisdiction. This is subject to certain exceptions, also set out in art 6. Perhaps 
most obviously, there is no obligation to enforce an invalid agreement — but 
importantly (as discussed further below), the Hague Convention requires this to 
be assessed based on the law of the state of the chosen court, including its choice 
of law rules.35 Similarly, an agreement need not be enforced where the parties 
lacked capacity to make it.36 A general public policy safety net is included,37 
permitting a state to refuse to enforce certain foreign exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements — there is little guidance on when this should be applicable, but it 
ought to be interpreted restrictively if it is not to undermine the purposes of the 
Hague Convention. Two final exceptions are where the agreement ‘cannot 
                                                 
 31 Currently 157 parties. See UNCITRAL, Status: Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958) 
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html> 
archived at <https://perma.cc/5CXS-J4ZQ>. 
 32 See Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Conference, ‘Suggested Further Work in 
Support of Forum and Law Selection in International Commercial Contracts’ (Preliminary 
Document No 5, Hague Conference on Private International Law Permanent Bureau, 
January 2017) <https://assets.hcch.net/docs/a357a94b-5bac-44c5-9fa3-4f1a079b2411.pdf> 
archived at <https://perma.cc/J8AN-WVHS>. 
 33 See, eg, Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 (Vic) r 7.02(b)(iv). 
 34 If the foreign court rejects the validity of the jurisdiction agreement, however, it will also 
reject the application of the Hague Convention to such a damages award.  
 35 Hague Convention art 6(a).  
 36 Ibid art 6(b). 
 37 Ibid art 6(c). 
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reasonably be performed’ and where the chosen court has declined jurisdiction.38 
In both cases, a court may exceptionally hear the case in breach of a foreign 
exclusive jurisdiction agreement to ensure that the claimant is able to obtain 
access to justice, a value which is evidently adjudged to outweigh party 
autonomy in these circumstances. 
It is also important to note in this context that the Hague Convention adopts 
the principle of severability, also known as separability. The validity of a choice 
of court agreement must be evaluated separately from the rest of the agreement 
between the parties. Under art 6, evidently the courts of a non-chosen state may 
have to decide on the validity of the choice of court clause. However, if issues 
arise concerning the general validity of the contract between the parties, these 
should generally be heard by the court chosen in the jurisdiction agreement, 
unless the invalidity would also specifically affect that agreement. 
C Interim Protective Measures 
Article 7 of the Hague Convention provides that interim protective measures, 
such as the availability of an asset freezing order in support of prospective 
proceedings, are left for national law. It is unclear whether this article 
encompasses anti-suit injunctions — on one view these are more like a final 
order to enforce the exclusive jurisdiction agreement rather than a protective 
measure, although they may also be issued on a provisional basis. The point is 
ultimately not significant, as in either case it is clear that the Hague Convention 
leaves the availability of anti-suit injunctions to national law. 
D Recognition and Enforcement 
The final key provisions to note are arts 8 and 9, which essentially provide 
that a judgment obtained from the courts of one Convention state on the basis of 
an exclusive jurisdiction agreement must generally be recognised in the courts of 
other Convention states, subject to various defences, set out in art 9, such as a 
breach of procedural fairness or public policy. 
It may be noted that the Hague Convention does not address the question of 
non-recognition — the obligation not to recognise a foreign judgment which has 
been obtained in breach of an exclusive jurisdiction agreement. The reason for 
this exclusion is probably that it would broaden the scope of the Hague 
Convention, because it relates to the non-enforcement of a judgment not based 
on a jurisdiction agreement. It may be presumed that this rule is nevertheless 
likely to be applied under the national law of Convention states. 
V THE IMPACT OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON AUSTRALIAN LAW39 
A Prorogation 
Should Australia accede to the Hague Convention, the most obvious effect 
would be in the context of prorogation. Accession to the Hague Convention 
                                                 
 38 Ibid art 6(d) and (e). 
 39 See generally Mary Keyes, ‘Jurisdiction under the Hague Choice of Courts Convention: Its 
Likely Impact on Australian Practice’ (2009) 5 Journal of Private International Law 181; 
Garnett, ‘The Hague Choice of Court Convention’, above n 16.  
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would mean that Australian courts would be obliged to exercise jurisdiction 
based on a valid exclusive jurisdiction agreement. Although, as noted above, 
they are already extremely likely to do this, the Hague Convention would 
remove the element of discretion and thus a degree of uncertainty. Another 
important effect would be that jurisdiction agreements in favour of Convention 
states would be presumed exclusive unless expressly non-exclusive. The current 
position under Australian law on the point is somewhat unclear — there is 
probably a presumption in favour of jurisdiction agreements being found to be 
exclusive, but a weaker one than that under the Hague Convention.40 This 
change might thus also be viewed as adding greater certainty, decreasing 
litigation over whether particular agreements are exclusive or non-exclusive, 
although there is an evident risk that a presumption might impute an intention 
which was not held by the parties to a particular agreement. 
The flipside of an increase in certainty is always a decrease in flexibility. In 
this context, the change would mean that Australian courts would be forced to 
hear a dispute covered by an exclusive jurisdiction agreement, even though it is 
part of a complex multi-party or multi-issue dispute largely being heard in a 
foreign court. Under the Hague Convention, the obligation to give effect to the 
agreement between the parties may thus risk decreasing the efficient resolution 
of some complex disputes, and may in some cases increase the risk of conflicting 
judgments. This raises the question of whether Australian state or federal 
legislatures should consider adopting broader rules of incidental jurisdiction — 
permitting the addition of related parties or related claims — an approach 
adopted in some Australian states,41 and recently broadened under English law.42 
This would facilitate the possibility that in some cases a complex dispute may be 
consolidated in the Australian courts rather than fragmented as a result of the 
Hague Convention. 
B Derogation 
The Hague Convention would have closely equivalent effects in the context of 
derogation. Australian courts would be obliged not to exercise jurisdiction where 
the claim is covered by a valid foreign exclusive jurisdiction agreement in favour 
of the courts of a Convention state, although as noted above they are already 
very likely not to do so. This greater certainty again means reduced flexibility — 
an inability to hear a dispute covered by a foreign exclusive jurisdiction clause 
which is part of a complex multi-party or multi-issue dispute largely being heard 
in an Australian court, however expansively the Australian court’s rules on 
incidental jurisdiction are drafted. The Hague Convention is also likely to mean 
that Australian courts cannot refuse to give effect to a foreign exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement on the sole basis that the foreign court would not 
recognise rights arising under Australian law (such as under statutory causes of 
                                                 
 40 See, eg, Armacel Pty Limited v Smurfit Stone Container Corporation (2008) 248 ALR 573 
[88]; Garnett, ‘The Hague Choice of Court Convention’, above n 16, 164. 
 41 See, eg, Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 (Vic) r 7.02(h)(i). Rule 
7.02(s) suggests that a recognised basis of jurisdiction must be found for each claim against 
a single defendant, but this is supplemented by r 7.03 under which a broader approach may 
be taken with the permission of the court.  
 42 Civil Procedure Rules (England and Wales) 1998 (UK) SI 1998/3132 Practice Direction 6B, 
para 3.1(4)–(4A).  
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action). In some circumstances these cases may continue to be covered by the 
public policy exception, but as noted above that exception should probably be 
interpreted restrictively. The position of insurance or franchise contracts would 
also be somewhat uncertain under the Hague Convention, unless Australia 
excluded them from its scope under art 21. 
As noted above, the Hague Convention requires the validity of a choice of 
court agreement to be assessed under the law of the chosen court, including its 
choice of law rules. The present position under Australian law on this point is 
somewhat uncertain, and there is authority for the view that the law of the forum 
should be applied instead.43 This would therefore be potentially a significant 
change in Australian law, and one which should increase international 
consistency in determining the validity of exclusive jurisdiction agreements, 
reducing the risk of conflicting judgments arising between the courts of 
Convention states. 
C Recognition and Enforcement 
In the context of recognition and enforcement of judgments, the effects of the 
Hague Convention would be less dramatic — foreign judgments based on 
exclusive jurisdiction agreements are already generally enforceable under 
Australian law and the defences under the Hague Convention are similar to those 
under common law or statute in Australia, although perhaps more narrowly 
defined. Under art 9(c), for example, concerns of procedural fairness are limited 
to notice of the commencement of proceedings, whereas under common law they 
might also encompass the conduct of proceedings.44 Under art 9(d), the defence 
of ‘fraud’ is limited to ‘a matter of procedure’, whereas under the common law it 
has not been limited in that way.45 In both contexts, however, it is possible that 
the general defence of public policy may cover any cases not caught by the 
specific defence.46 One significant change, however, is that the Hague 
Convention provides for the enforceability of non-monetary judgments, such as 
an order for specific performance. This would be a positive development of an 
outmoded common law rule, already more broadly rejected by the Canadian 
Supreme Court.47 It should be noted of course that Australia’s accession to the 
Hague Convention would also mean that judgments from Australian courts 
would equally gain the benefit of greater recognition and enforcement in other 
Convention states. 
VI THE REGIONAL IMPACT OF SINGAPORE’S ACCESSION TO THE HAGUE 
CONVENTION 
As noted above, Singapore became a party to the Hague Convention in 2016, 
and has implemented it through the Choice of Court Agreements Act 2016 
(Singapore). It is no secret that Singapore has recently been pushing to establish 
itself as a dispute resolution centre, certainly for the Asia-Pacific region, and to 
                                                 
 43 See, eg, Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co Inc v Fay (1988) 165 CLR 197, 202, 225, 
256, 260.  
 44 See, eg, Adams v Cape Industries [1990] 1 Ch 433.  
 45 See, eg, Jet Holdings Inc v Patel [1990] 1 QB 335.  
 46 Hague Convention art 9(e). 
 47 See, eg, Pro Swing v Elta Golf [2006] 2 SCR 612.  
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some extent also for the world. In 2015, Singapore established a new 
International Commercial Court (‘SICC’), which has a number of innovative 
features which are designed to attract international disputes, including more 
flexible rules of evidence, the possibility of having foreign lawyers and 
international judges, and simpler procedures for proving the content of foreign 
law. Singapore’s accession to the Hague Convention in 2016 also means that 
judgments from the Singapore courts which are based on an exclusive choice of 
court clause are more readily recognised and enforced in member states of the 
EU. 
These developments present risks and opportunities for the Australian legal 
services industry. Australian lawyers now have the opportunity to act before the 
SICC based on their Australian qualifications. Australian lawyers advising 
clients engaged in cross-border activity should already be considering the 
benefits of the SICC as an alternative to choosing other national courts or 
arbitration. There is, however, also a risk for the Australian legal services 
industry that parties doing business in Asia, or Asian parties doing business in 
Australia, may end up preferring the SICC to Australian courts, in part because 
its judgments are more readily enforceable under the Hague Convention. If 
Australia also accedes to the Hague Convention, as proposed, this relative 
advantage will be removed because Australian judgments will be equally 
enforceable — Australian courts would be able to compete more readily with the 
SICC. However, this would also mean that judgments from the SICC would 
benefit from the Hague Convention enforcement rules in Australia. A side effect 
of Australia becoming a party to the Hague Convention would thus be to 
increase the attractiveness of the SICC for contracts involving Australian parties, 
as discussed further below. 
VII BROADER INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION 
As discussed above one of the purposes of the Hague Convention is to 
promote the use of national courts, to level the playing field between litigation 
and arbitration, through providing greater certainty and uniformity in the rules 
governing the direct and indirect effects of exclusive jurisdiction agreements. 
Given the limited number of parties at present, the Hague Convention evidently 
has a long way to go to achieve the harmonisation effects of the New York 
Convention, but in the long run there is no obvious reason why this would not be 
possible. It is worth pausing, however, to ask whether this would necessarily be 
desirable. There are different views on whether encouraging national litigation 
over arbitration would actually be a positive development. One of the reasons 
why states often promote arbitration through favourable national laws (and 
accession to the New York Convention) is that arbitration privatises the cost of 
commercial dispute resolution, allowing disputes to be resolved without 
imposing a burden on the courts. This attitude is reflected in other contexts — in 
the United States, for example, there has at least traditionally been hostility to the 
idea that the parties could impose the burden of resolving their disputes on a 
particular forum, unless that forum itself had an interest in the litigation. 
Certainly, under US law the question of forum allocation is commonly not just a 
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matter for the parties but also a question of public interest.48 On the other hand, 
the view has long been taken in London that commercial litigation is not a 
burden but a business opportunity, one which London has developed into an 
important and world-leading industry — a perspective which is much more 
likely to welcome the effects of the Hague Convention. The greater certainty and 
uniformity around the effectiveness of choice of court agreements should also, at 
least in theory, promote cross-border economic activity between Convention 
states. By simplifying, strengthening and harmonising the rules around exclusive 
jurisdiction agreements, litigation risk should be reduced, providing a modest 
boost to cross-border business. 
As already noted above, one of the effects of the Hague Convention should be 
to promote choice of the courts of Convention states in exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements, because judgments based on those agreements will be made more 
powerful. It is important to note, however, that these effects are symmetrical 
between Convention states (one state cannot make its own judgments more 
powerful without also making the judgments of other states more powerful), and 
also may have counterintuitive asymmetrical effects where one party to a dispute 
is from a non-Convention state. Two examples are illustrative. 
Imagine under existing law you are advising an Australian company 
negotiating with a German company, and the German company proposes an 
exclusive choice of court agreement in favour of the Singapore courts as a 
neutral option. This is potentially quite a good choice from the perspective of the 
Australian company. If the Australian company successfully sues the German 
company in Singapore, they get a judgment which is enforceable under the 
Hague Convention in Germany, where the defendant’s assets are most likely to 
be located. On the other hand, if the German company sues the Australian 
company in Singapore, they get a judgment which can only be enforced under 
Australian law, not under the Hague Convention, which may allow for more 
defences. Of course there are many other reasons to choose a particular court, but 
from the perspective of relative enforceability, Singapore would be a particularly 
good choice for parties who are not from Convention states, contracting with 
parties from Convention states. 
For a second example, imagine that Australia accedes to the Hague 
Convention, and you are advising an Australian company entering into a contract 
with a Chinese company. The Chinese company proposes an exclusive choice of 
court agreement in favour of Singapore, as a neutral option. In this context, 
accepting such an agreement would probably be disadvantageous. If the Chinese 
company successfully sues the Australian company in Singapore, the judgment 
will be readily enforceable in Australia, under the Hague Convention. But if the 
Australian company sues the Chinese company in Singapore, the judgment will 
not be readily enforceable in China, because China is not a party to the Hague 
Convention. Accession to the Hague Convention would thus have the curious 
effect of making exclusive choice of court agreements in favour of other 
Convention states less desirable for Australian contracting parties. 
These examples are not only illustrations of some interesting strategic 
implications of the Hague Convention, but also a reminder that in the course of 
                                                 
 48 This point is reflected in art 19 of the Hague Convention, as discussed in Part IV(A) above.  
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negotiating any choice of forum agreement (whether in favour of a court or 
arbitration), it is important to consider not only the features of different courts or 
tribunals, but the enforceability of any potential judgments, taking into account 
the location of assets against which a judgment or arbitral award can be enforced. 
VIII CONCLUSIONS 
Jurisdiction agreements may appear simple, but their effects can be complex. 
Australia’s proposed accession to the Hague Convention may have significant 
costs, including increasing the expense of some complex litigation, and 
increasing the risks of conflicting judgments arising in some circumstances. Any 
new law reform, even one aimed at increasing certainty, inevitably also has the 
effect of decreasing certainty in the short term until a consistent jurisprudence 
has developed around the interpretation of the rules. The need to rely on foreign 
authority to ensure consistent interpretation of the Hague Convention may add 
expense to litigation in the short term, as may the addition of a further regime of 
jurisdictional rules on top of the complexity of the existing rules of Australian 
federal and state courts. Depending on the terms of accession and on how the 
rules are interpreted, the Hague Convention might also reduce the legal 
safeguards offered to certain weaker parties such as franchisees or purchasers of 
insurance, and may reduce the effectiveness of Australian statutes creating 
private causes of action. 
Ultimately, however, accession to the Hague Convention is likely to be 
welcomed by most commercial parties, who will value the overall increased 
certainty it will bring in the long run. There are potential benefits for all 
Australian business seeking to conduct their activities internationally, and also 
for Australia’s ability to compete in regional and global markets for the provision 
of dispute resolution services. In this respect, Singapore’s accession in 2016 is 
particularly significant regionally, along with the development of the SICC, and 
Australia’s proposed accession could also have an important impact. Indeed, it is 
important to note that the Hague Convention already affects the potential 
benefits and risks of some choice of court agreements — those in favour of 
Convention states — because it already affects the enforceability of those 
agreements and of judgments from those states. 
On balance, it is also this author’s view that accession to the Hague 
Convention would be a positive move for Australia and for the global 
development of rules on jurisdiction — private international law works best 
when it is coordinated and international and the development of the Hague 
Convention, while not without some disadvantages, is a step in the right direction 
as part of a broader ongoing project at the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law.49 Australian lawyers and commercial parties will, however, 
need to be aware of the complexities the Hague Convention creates, not only in 
terms of its impact on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in Australia, but also in terms of the strategic questions surrounding 
their choice of forum for international disputes. Australia’s potential accession to 
                                                 
 49 This project deals more broadly with the recognition and enforcement of judgments, and 
also potentially jurisdiction. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, The 
Judgments Project <https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislativeprojects/judgments> 
archived at <https://perma.cc/9DCC-HCWF>. 
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the Hague Convention may thus also serve as an important reminder that choice 
of forum is not a simple matter for boiler plate clauses, but a strategic issue 
which requires careful consideration and analysis. 
